PatchFirst · Свежие уязвимости
За последние 30 дней в curl опубликовано уязвимостей: 12; в каталоге KEV: 0.
Уязвимостей: 189
A flaw in curl’s cookie parsing logic allows a malicious HTTP server to set "super cookies" that bypass the Public Suffix List check. This enables an attacker-controlled origin to inject cookies that curl subsequently scopes and transmits to unrelated third-party domains.
libcurl might in some circumstances reuse the wrong connection when asked to do Negotiate-authenticated ones, even when they are set to use different "services". libcurl features a pool of recent connections so that subsequent requests can reuse an existing connection to avoid overhead. When reusing a connection a range of criteria must be met. Due to a logical error in the code, a request that was issued by an application could wrongfully reuse an existing connection to the same server that was authenticated using different services.
A vulnerability exists where a new transfer that uses STARTTLS to upgrade the connection might reuse an existing live connection even though the TLS configuration mismatches so it should not.
When a user invokes curl using a schemeless URL combined with `--proto-default` sftp (or scp), a disconnect occurs between the tool layer and libcurl. The tool layer incorrectly infers the URL scheme, which erroneously bypasses the initialization of critical SSH security options like CURLOPT_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_SHA256 and CURLOPT_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS. Conversely, the libcurl runtime successfully honors CURLOPT_DEFAULT_PROTOCOL and establishes the connection via SFTP/SCP as specified. Because the tool layer skipped the security configuration, these SSH host verification options are silently omitted, causing curl to connect to an unverified SSH remot
Successfully using libcurl to do a transfer to a specific HTTP origin (`hostA`) with **Digest** authentication and then changing the origin to a different one (`hostB`) for a second transfer, reusing the same handle, makes libcurl wrongly pass on the `Authorization:` header field meant for `hostA`, to `hostB`.
A use-after-free vulnerability exists in libcurl when an application configures an HTTP/2 stream-dependency tree via `CURLOPT_STREAM_DEPENDS` or `CURLOPT_STREAM_DEPENDS_E`, subsequently invokes `curl_easy_reset()`, and finally terminates the handle with `curl_easy_cleanup()`. During this final cleanup phase, libcurl attempts to access and modify an internal structure that was already freed during the reset operation.
Successfully using libcurl to do a transfer over a specific HTTP proxy (`proxyA`) with **Digest** authentication and then changing the proxy host to a second one (`proxyB`) for a second transfer, reusing the same handle, makes libcurl wrongly pass on the `Proxy-Authorization:` header field meant for `proxyA`, to `proxyB`.
When asked to both use a `.netrc` file for credentials and to follow HTTP redirects, libcurl could leak the password used for the first host to the followed-to host under certain circumstances.
Using libcurl, when a custom `Host:` header is first set for an HTTP request and a second request is subsequently done using the same *easy handle* but without the custom `Host:` header set, the second request would use stale information and pass on cookies meant for the first host in the second request. Leak them.
curl might erroneously pass on credentials for a first proxy to a second proxy. This can happen when the following conditions are true: 1. curl is setup to use specific different proxies for different URL schemes 2. the first proxy needs credentials 3. the second proxy uses no credentials 4. while using the first proxy (using say `http://`), curl is asked to follow a redirect to a URL using another scheme (say `https://`), accessed using a second, different, proxy
libcurl might in some circumstances reuse the wrong connection for SMB(S) transfers. libcurl features a pool of recent connections so that subsequent requests can reuse an existing connection to avoid overhead. When reusing a connection a range of criteria must be met. Due to a logical error in the code, a network transfer operation that was requested by an application could wrongfully reuse an existing SMB connection to the same server that was using a different "share" than the new subsequent transfer should. This could in unlucky situations lead to the download of the wrong file or the upload of a file to the wrong place. When this happ
libcurl might in some circumstances reuse the wrong connection when asked to do an authenticated HTTP(S) request after a Negotiate-authenticated one, when both use the same host. libcurl features a pool of recent connections so that subsequent requests can reuse an existing connection to avoid overhead. When reusing a connection a range of criteria must be met. Due to a logical error in the code, a request that was issued by an application could wrongfully reuse an existing connection to the same server that was authenticated using different credentials. An application that first uses Negotiate authentication to a server with `user1:passwo
A vulnerability exists where a connection requiring TLS incorrectly reuses an existing unencrypted connection from the same connection pool. If an initial transfer is made in clear-text (via IMAP, SMTP, or POP3), a subsequent request to that same host bypasses the TLS requirement and instead transmit data unencrypted.
curl would wrongly reuse an existing HTTP proxy connection doing CONNECT to a server, even if the new request uses different credentials for the HTTP proxy. The proper behavior is to create or use a separate connection.
When an OAuth2 bearer token is used for an HTTP(S) transfer, and that transfer performs a redirect to a second URL, curl could leak that token to the second hostname under some circumstances. If the hostname that the first request is redirected to has information in the used .netrc file, with either of the `machine` or `default` keywords, curl would pass on the bearer token set for the first host also to the second one.
libcurl can in some circumstances reuse the wrong connection when asked to do an Negotiate-authenticated HTTP or HTTPS request. libcurl features a pool of recent connections so that subsequent requests can reuse an existing connection to avoid overhead. When reusing a connection a range of criterion must first be met. Due to a logical error in the code, a request that was issued by an application could wrongfully reuse an existing connection to the same server that was authenticated using different credentials. One underlying reason being that Negotiate sometimes authenticates *connections* and not *requests*, contrary to how HTTP is design
When doing SSH-based transfers using either SCP or SFTP, and asked to do public key authentication, curl would wrongly still ask and authenticate using a locally running SSH agent.
When doing SSH-based transfers using either SCP or SFTP, and setting the known_hosts file, libcurl could still mistakenly accept connecting to hosts *not present* in the specified file if they were added as recognized in the libssh *global* known_hosts file.
When doing TLS related transfers with reused easy or multi handles and altering the `CURLSSLOPT_NO_PARTIALCHAIN` option, libcurl could accidentally reuse a CA store cached in memory for which the partial chain option was reversed. Contrary to the user's wishes and expectations. This could make libcurl find and accept a trust chain that it otherwise would not.
When an OAuth2 bearer token is used for an HTTP(S) transfer, and that transfer performs a cross-protocol redirect to a second URL that uses an IMAP, LDAP, POP3 or SMTP scheme, curl might wrongly pass on the bearer token to the new target host.
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