По данным OpenNet, в Node.js найдена уязвимость — удалённое выполнение кода (CVE-2026-111497). Точные затронутые версии не указаны. Версия с исправлением в сообщении не указана.
Что сделать сейчас: Проверьте, вышло ли обновление Node.js с исправлением, и установите его.
По данным OpenNet, в PHP найдена уязвимость — удалённое выполнение кода (CVE-2026-115560). Точные затронутые версии не указаны. Версия с исправлением в сообщении не указана.
Что сделать сейчас: Проверьте, вышло ли обновление PHP с исправлением, и установите его.
Important: kernel security, bug fix, and enhancement update
The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system.
Security Fix(es):
* kernel: netlabel: Fix NULL pointer exception caused by CALIPSO on IPv4 sockets (CVE-2025-22063)
* kernel: calipso: Don't call calipso functions for AF_INET sk. (CVE-2025-38147)
* kernel: ALSA: hda/cs35l41: Fix firmware load work teardown (CVE-2026-64481)
* kernel: ALSA: seq: close a re-opened queue timer in the destructor (CVE-2026-68202)
* kernel: vmxnet3: fix BUG_ON in vmxnet3_get_hdr_len() for Geneve packets (CVE-2026-68299)
* kernel: ovl: check access to copy_file_range source with src mounter creds (CVE-2026-68448)
* kernel:
Mozilla Thunderbird is a standalone mail and newsgroup client.
Security Fix(es):
* firefox: thunderbird: Use-after-free in the Graphics: Canvas2D component (CVE-2026-100832)
* firefox: Use-after-free in the Layout: Text and Fonts component (CVE-2026-100784)
* firefox: thunderbird: Privilege escalation in the DLL Services component (CVE-2026-100801)
* firefox: thunderbird: Sandbox escape due to incorrect boundary conditions in the Internationalization component (CVE-2026-100794)
* firefox: thunderbird: Privilege escalation in the Address Bar component (CVE-2026-100820)
* firefox: thunderbird: Use-after-free in the Graphics: Canvas2D com
Mozilla Firefox is an open-source web browser, designed for standards compliance, performance, and portability.
Security Fix(es):
* firefox: thunderbird: Sandbox escape due to incorrect boundary conditions in the Graphics component (CVE-2026-92035)
* firefox: thunderbird: Use-after-free in the Graphics: Canvas2D component (CVE-2026-100832)
* firefox: Use-after-free in the Layout: Text and Fonts component (CVE-2026-100784)
* firefox: thunderbird: Privilege escalation in the DLL Services component (CVE-2026-100801)
* firefox: thunderbird: Sandbox escape due to incorrect boundary conditions in the Internationalization component (CVE-2026-1
Mozilla Thunderbird is a standalone mail and newsgroup client.
Security Fix(es):
* firefox: thunderbird: Use-after-free in the Graphics: Canvas2D component (CVE-2026-100832)
* firefox: Use-after-free in the Layout: Text and Fonts component (CVE-2026-100784)
* firefox: thunderbird: Privilege escalation in the DLL Services component (CVE-2026-100801)
* firefox: thunderbird: Sandbox escape due to incorrect boundary conditions in the Internationalization component (CVE-2026-100794)
* firefox: thunderbird: Privilege escalation in the Address Bar component (CVE-2026-100820)
* firefox: thunderbird: Use-after-free in the Graphics: Canvas2D com
Mozilla Firefox is an open-source web browser, designed for standards compliance, performance, and portability.
Security Fix(es):
* firefox: thunderbird: Sandbox escape due to incorrect boundary conditions in the Graphics component (CVE-2026-92035)
* firefox: thunderbird: Use-after-free in the Graphics: Canvas2D component (CVE-2026-100832)
* firefox: Use-after-free in the Layout: Text and Fonts component (CVE-2026-100784)
* firefox: thunderbird: Privilege escalation in the DLL Services component (CVE-2026-100801)
* firefox: thunderbird: Sandbox escape due to incorrect boundary conditions in the Internationalization component (CVE-2026-1
Mozilla Firefox is an open-source web browser, designed for standards compliance, performance, and portability.
Security Fix(es):
* firefox: thunderbird: Sandbox escape due to incorrect boundary conditions in the Graphics component (CVE-2026-92035)
* firefox: thunderbird: Use-after-free in the Graphics: Canvas2D component (CVE-2026-100832)
* firefox: Use-after-free in the Layout: Text and Fonts component (CVE-2026-100784)
* firefox: thunderbird: Privilege escalation in the DLL Services component (CVE-2026-100801)
* firefox: thunderbird: Sandbox escape due to incorrect boundary conditions in the Internationalization component (CVE-2026-1
The ca-certificates package contains a set of Certificate Authority (CA) certificates chosen by the Mozilla Foundation for use with the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Security Fix(es):
* ca-certificates: Distrust eMudhra intermediate CA certificates due to security concerns (CVE-2026-114406)
For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.
filelock: ReadWriteLock on Windows acts on SQLite side files another local user places beside its database
On Windows, `ReadWriteLock` and `AsyncReadWriteLock` (the SQLite-backed reader/writer lock) connect SQLite to the lock database by its path, in every directory. SQLite derives three side files from that path: `<database>-journal`, the rollback journal (pages saved to undo an interrupted write); `<database>-wal`, the write-ahead log (changes kept outside the main file); and `<database>-shm`, the shared-memory index of the WAL. SQLite acts on whichever of these it finds beside the database before the lock runs any statement. Another local account that can create files in the database's directory, but not delete files of other accounts there, pl
filelock: On Windows an oplock on a soft lock's marker holds SoftFileLock.acquire() past its timeout and blocks the stale break
On Windows the soft locks (`SoftFileLock`, `MarkerSoftFileLock`, `SoftFileLease`, their async forms, and a `FileLock` that fell back to a soft lock) read their marker by path. The marker is the lock file whose presence says a process holds the lock. Each `acquire()` attempt that finds a marker opens it with `os.open` to read the holder's process id, and the lock renames and deletes a marker it judges stale, by path. On Windows each of these calls waits for an oplock. An oplock (opportunistic lock) is a request by a process that holds a handle on a file to be told before another process opens, renames or deletes that file; the other process wa
Arbitrary file read and backend crash through unrestricted provider method calls
Postiz lets a signed-in user ask the backend to run a function on one of their connected channels. The backend did not restrict which functions can be requested, so a user could call internal helper functions that were never meant to be reachable from the web interface.
One of those helpers reads a file from the server's disk. A user who connects a channel whose stored token is a file path can have the backend return the contents of any file it can read, including its environment, which holds the secret used to sign login sessions, the database address and the credentials of connected services. Another helper makes the backend process exit w
Craft CMS allows any authenticated control panel user to submit an element-search condition whose element selector is evaluated as a sandboxed Twig object template. Craft’s allowed column filter delegates property lookup to Yii ArrayHelper, outside Twig’s SecurityPolicy. Repeated single-segment lookups therefore bypass the sandbox’s empty property/method allowlists.
The vulnerable condition value is ultimately cast to an integer. That does not protect the secret: the template can return author ID 1 when a guessed key character is correct and an impossible ID otherwise. The JSON endpoint returns entries for the first case and an empty array
Fallow: A `.*` glob segment let an analyzed repository make Fallow test paths in the parent of the project root
### Impact
Fallow expands some globs from the analyzed repository on disk. Before 3.34.0, a segment such as `.*`, `.?` or `..*` in such a glob also matched the special `..` entry. The `glob` crate tests `..` against a segment that starts with a literal `.`. Fallow validates plugin glob patterns and refuses absolute paths and `..` segments, but these segments passed that validation.
The attacker controls the repository content. The attacker must also be able to read the Fallow output, for example a CI log or a pull request comment. Then the attacker can learn if a file or directory exists in the parent of the project root:
- A plugin `fileE
postal-mime: Quadratic CPU consumption when decoding a header of many joinable RFC 2047 base64 encoded words
### Impact
Decoding a header that holds a long run of joinable RFC 2047 base64 encoded words, such as `=?utf-8?B?QUJD?=` repeated tens of thousands of times in a `Subject`, `From`, `To`, a filename or a description, took time quadratic in the number of words. The join check ran a regex over the text joined so far for every word, which flattens the accumulated string each time. A single well formed message of about 1.6 MB blocked the event loop for one to twenty seconds depending on the host, and inline `message/rfc822` parts multiplied the cost, since each nested message carried its own header budget.
Any application that parses untrusted m
Nodemailer: A nested comment ends early in addressparser, releasing the rest of the comment as a recipient
### Vulnerability summary
RFC 5322 comments nest. addressparser ended a comment at the first `)`, including the one that closes a nested comment, and parsed the rest of the outer comment as header text. `Victim (x(y) <evil@evil.com>) <v@victim.com>` names `v@victim.com` with `x(y) <evil@evil.com>` as a comment, and Nodemailer read it as the address `evil@evil.com`. This is the same shape as the escaped parenthesis fixed in 10.1.2, reached through nesting instead of a quoted-pair. Affected: 3.0.0 through 10.1.3.
### Attacker capabilities
The attacker controls the text of an address that an application passes to Nodemailer, or the From or To
Nodemailer: A ";" inside a quoted string or comment ends an address group early in addressparser, turning display text into a recipient
### Vulnerability summary
addressparser ends an RFC 5322 group at the first `;`, including one inside a quoted display name or a comment. The text after it is parsed again as top level recipients with the quoting flipped, so text that every conformant parser reads as a display name or comment becomes a live address. `G: (a; <evil@evil.com>) <v@victim.com>;` names only `v@victim.com`, and Nodemailer read it as the single recipient `evil@evil.com`. Affected: 3.0.0 through 10.1.3.
### Attacker capabilities
The attacker controls the text of an address field that an application passes to Nodemailer, or the header of an inbound message parsed wi
Nodemailer: A ">" inside a quoted local part ends an angle-addr early in addressparser, delivering to a domain the header does not name
### Vulnerability summary
addressparser ends an angle-addr at the first `>` it sees, including one inside a quoted local part, a comment or a domain literal. The domain is then read off the text in front of that `>`. `<"a@evil.com>"@good.com>` is the mailbox `"a@evil.com>"@good.com` under RFC 5322, and Nodemailer read it as an address at `evil.com`. The unbracketed spelling of the same value was already read correctly. Affected: 3.0.0 through 10.1.3.
### Attacker capabilities
The attacker controls the text of a recipient or sender address that an application passes to Nodemailer, for example a To value entered in a contact or invite form,
Unauthenticated payment reuse allows unpaid orders to be marked as paid
The Mollie webhook endpoint accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters and never verifies that they belong together:
* commerceTransactionHash — selects which Craft Commerce transaction is completed
* id — selects which Mollie payment is queried for its status
An unauthenticated attacker holding any paid Mollie payment ID from the merchant’s account can pair it with any transaction hash.
Commerce queries Mollie, sees status: paid, and marks the target transaction successful for that transaction’s full
amount, regardless of how much was actually paid.