PatchFirst · Свежие уязвимости
За последние 30 дней в pypy3 опубликовано уязвимостей: 5; в каталоге KEV: 0.
Уязвимостей: 78
DISPUTED: The project has clarified that the documentation was incorrect, and that pkgutil.get_data() has the same security model as open(). The documentation has been updated to clarify this point. There is no vulnerability in the function if following the intended security model. pkgutil.get_data() did not validate the resource argument as documented, allowing path traversals.
Python-Markdown version 3.8 contain a vulnerability where malformed HTML-like sequences can cause html.parser.HTMLParser to raise an unhandled AssertionError during Markdown parsing. Because Python-Markdown does not catch this exception, any application that processes attacker-controlled Markdown may crash. This enables remote, unauthenticated Denial of Service in web applications, documentation systems, CI/CD pipelines, and any service that renders untrusted Markdown. The issue was acknowledged by the vendor and fixed in version 3.8.1. This issue causes a remote Denial of Service in any application parsing untrusted Markdown, and can lead to
The import hook in CPython that handles legacy *.pyc files (SourcelessFileLoader) is incorrectly handled in FileLoader (a base class) and so does not use io.open_code() to read the .pyc files. sys.audit handlers for this audit event therefore do not fire.
The email module, specifically the "BytesGenerator" class, didn’t properly quote newlines for email headers when serializing an email message allowing for header injection when an email is serialized. This is only applicable if using "LiteralHeader" writing headers that don't respect email folding rules, the new behavior will reject the incorrectly folded headers in "BytesGenerator".
When passing data to the b64decode(), standard_b64decode(), and urlsafe_b64decode() functions in the "base64" module the characters "+/" will always be accepted, regardless of the value of "altchars" parameter, typically used to establish an "alternative base64 alphabet" such as the URL safe alphabet. This behavior matches what is recommended in earlier base64 RFCs, but newer RFCs now recommend either dropping characters outside the specified base64 alphabet or raising an error. The old behavior has the possibility of causing data integrity issues. This behavior can only be insecure if your application uses an alternate base64 alphabet (w
When using http.cookies.Morsel, user-controlled cookie values and parameters can allow injecting HTTP headers into messages. Patch rejects all control characters within cookie names, values, and parameters.
The poplib module, when passed a user-controlled command, can have additional commands injected using newlines. Mitigation rejects commands containing control characters.
The imaplib module, when passed a user-controlled command, can have additional commands injected using newlines. Mitigation rejects commands containing control characters.
User-controlled data URLs parsed by urllib.request.DataHandler allow injecting headers through newlines in the data URL mediatype.
User-controlled header names and values containing newlines can allow injecting HTTP headers.
When folding a long comment in an email header containing exclusively unfoldable characters, the parenthesis would not be preserved. This could be used for injecting headers into email messages where addresses are user-controlled and not sanitized.
When building nested elements using xml.dom.minidom methods such as appendChild() that have a dependency on _clear_id_cache() the algorithm is quadratic. Availability can be impacted when building excessively nested documents.
When loading a plist file, the plistlib module reads data in size specified by the file itself, meaning a malicious file can cause OOM and DoS issues
When reading an HTTP response from a server, if no read amount is specified, the default behavior will be to use Content-Length. This allows a malicious server to cause the client to read large amounts of data into memory, potentially causing OOM or other DoS.
If the value passed to os.path.expandvars() is user-controlled a performance degradation is possible when expanding environment variables.
The 'zipfile' module would not check the validity of the ZIP64 End of Central Directory (EOCD) Locator record offset value would not be used to locate the ZIP64 EOCD record, instead the ZIP64 EOCD record would be assumed to be the previous record in the ZIP archive. This could be abused to create ZIP archives that are handled differently by the 'zipfile' module compared to other ZIP implementations. Remediation maintains this behavior, but checks that the offset specified in the ZIP64 EOCD Locator record matches the expected value.
There is a defect in the CPython “tarfile” module affecting the “TarFile” extraction and entry enumeration APIs. The tar implementation would process tar archives with negative offsets without error, resulting in an infinite loop and deadlock during the parsing of maliciously crafted tar archives. This vulnerability can be mitigated by including the following patch after importing the “tarfile” module: https://gist.github.com/sethmlarson/1716ac5b82b73dbcbf23ad2eff8b33e1
The html.parser.HTMLParser class had worse-case quadratic complexity when processing certain crafted malformed inputs potentially leading to amplified denial-of-service.
Allows modifying some file metadata (e.g. last modified) with filter="data" or file permissions (chmod) with filter="tar" of files outside the extraction directory. You are affected by this vulnerability if using the tarfile module to extract untrusted tar archives using TarFile.extractall() or TarFile.extract() using the filter= parameter with a value of "data" or "tar". See the tarfile extraction filters documentation https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile-extraction-filter for more information. Only Python versions 3.12 or later are affected by these vulnerabilities, earlier versions don't include the extraction filter fe
When using a TarFile.errorlevel = 0 and extracting with a filter the documented behavior is that any filtered members would be skipped and not extracted. However the actual behavior of TarFile.errorlevel = 0 in affected versions is that the member would still be extracted and not skipped.
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