undici vulnerable to cross-user information disclosure and parse-time crash via degenerate private cache directives
undici's cache interceptor mishandles malformed Cache-Control private directives. In undici 7.0.0 up to before 7.29.0 and 8.0.0 up to before 8.9.0, a response carrying a degenerate qualified private directive, such as private set to an empty value, can be stored in the default shared cache and later served to a different caller with the same cache key, disclosing private response bodies and headers including Set-Cookie. Separately, a Cache-Control header that combines an unqualified private directive with a qualified one triggers an uncaught TypeError in the cache-control parser, which rejects the request and, depending on the consumer's erro
undici vulnerable to Set-Cookie SameSite attribute downgrade via permissive substring matching
Impact:
When undici parses a Set-Cookie header, it accepts any SameSite attribute value that contains Strict, Lax, or None as a substring, rather than the case-insensitive exact match specified by RFC 6265. Non-spec values are silently mapped to one of the three standard tokens. For example, SameSite=NoneOfYourBusiness is parsed as None (the most permissive setting), and SameSite=StrictLax is parsed as Lax (a downgrade from Strict).
Affected applications are those that consume Set-Cookie headers from server responses (for example via undici's fetch or proxy code paths) and then forward or rely on the parsed sameSite attribute. A malicious or
undici vulnerable to HTTP response queue poisoning via keep-alive socket reuse
Impact:
Undici's HTTP/1.1 client is vulnerable to response queue poisoning on reused keep-alive sockets. An attacker-controlled upstream server can inject an unsolicited HTTP/1.1 response onto an idle socket after a request completes. When the client dispatches the next request on that socket, it associates the injected response with the new request, causing responses to be delivered to the wrong requests.
This requires an attacker-controlled or compromised upstream HTTP/1.1 server and keep-alive connection reuse.
Patches:
Upgrade to undici v6.26.0, v7.28.0 or v8.5.0.
Workarounds:
Disable keep-alive connection reuse by setting keepAliveTim
undici vulnerable to cross-user information disclosure via shared cache whitespace bypass
Impact:
Undici's cache interceptor incorrectly classifies some responses as cacheable when the upstream Cache-Control header uses whitespace-padded qualified private or no-cache field names such as private=" authorization" or no-cache="\tauthorization". The parser preserves the surrounding whitespace, so later comparisons against the literal authorization field name fail and the response is stored.
In shared-cache mode, this allows a response containing one user's authenticated data to be served from cache to a subsequent caller, including an unauthenticated caller, when both requests resolve to the same cache key.
Affected applications are
undici vulnerable to HTTP header injection via Set-Cookie percent-decoding
Impact:
undici's cookie parser in parseSetCookie percent-decodes cookie values via qsUnescape, turning encoded sequences like %0D%0A, %00, %3B, and %3D into their literal byte equivalents. RFC 6265 §5.4 does not specify any decoding and browsers do not decode either.
Applications that parse a Set-Cookie header and then forward the parsed value into a response header (proxies, middleware, SSR frameworks) become vulnerable to HTTP response header injection: an attacker-controlled upstream can inject arbitrary Set-Cookie, Location, or Cache-Control headers into the application's downstream response, enabling session fixation, open redirect, or
undici WebSocket client vulnerable to denial of service via fragment count bypass
Impact:
The undici WebSocket client enforces maxPayloadSize on the cumulative byte count of fragments in a message but does not enforce a limit on the number of fragments. A malicious WebSocket server can stream many small or empty continuation frames that each pass per-frame and cumulative-size validation, collectively causing unbounded memory growth in the client process. The result is memory exhaustion and a denial of service.
Affected applications are those using the undici WebSocket client (new WebSocket(...)) or the WebSocketStream API that can be induced to connect to an attacker-controlled or compromised WebSocket endpoint.
All rele
undici is vulnerable to Unhandled Exception in undici WebSocket Client Due to Invalid server_max_window_bits Validation
ImpactThe undici WebSocket client is vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack due to improper validation of the server_max_window_bits parameter in the permessage-deflate extension. When a WebSocket client connects to a server, it automatically advertises support for permessage-deflate compression. A malicious server can respond with an out-of-range server_max_window_bits value (outside zlib's valid range of 8-15). When the server subsequently sends a compressed frame, the client attempts to create a zlib InflateRaw instance with the invalid windowBits value, causing a synchronous RangeError exception that is not caught, resulting in immediat
undici is vulnerable to Malicious WebSocket 64-bit length overflows undici parser and crashes the client
ImpactA server can reply with a WebSocket frame using the 64-bit length form and an extremely large length. undici's ByteParser overflows internal math, ends up in an invalid state, and throws a fatal TypeError that terminates the process.
Patches
Patched in the undici version v7.24.0 and v6.24.0. Users should upgrade to this version or later.
undici is vulnerable to CRLF Injection via upgrade option
ImpactWhen an application passes user-controlled input to the upgrade option of client.request(), an attacker can inject CRLF sequences (\r\n) to:
* Inject arbitrary HTTP headers
* Terminate the HTTP request prematurely and smuggle raw data to non-HTTP services (Redis, Memcached, Elasticsearch)
The vulnerability exists because undici writes the upgrade value directly to the socket without validating for invalid header characters:
// lib/dispatcher/client-h1.js:1121
if (upgrade) {
header += `connection: upgrade\r\nupgrade: ${upgrade}\r\n`
}
undici is vulnerable to Unbounded Memory Consumption in in Undici's DeduplicationHandler via Response Buffering leads to DoS
This is an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability (CWE-400) that can lead to Denial of Service (DoS).
In vulnerable Undici versions, when interceptors.deduplicate() is enabled, response data for deduplicated requests could be accumulated in memory for downstream handlers. An attacker-controlled or untrusted upstream endpoint can exploit this with large/chunked responses and concurrent identical requests, causing high memory usage and potential OOM process termination.
Impacted users are applications that use Undici’s deduplication interceptor against endpoints that may produce large or long-lived response bodies.
PatchesThe issue
undici is vulnerable to Unbounded Memory Consumption in undici WebSocket permessage-deflate Decompression
The undici WebSocket client is vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack via unbounded memory consumption during permessage-deflate decompression. When a WebSocket connection negotiates the permessage-deflate extension, the client decompresses incoming compressed frames without enforcing any limit on the decompressed data size. A malicious WebSocket server can send a small compressed frame (a "decompression bomb") that expands to an extremely large size in memory, causing the Node.js process to exhaust available memory and crash or become unresponsive.
The vulnerability exists in the PerMessageDeflate.decompress() method, which accumulates al
undici is vulnerable to Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
Undici allows duplicate HTTP Content-Length headers when they are provided in an array with case-variant names (e.g., Content-Length and content-length). This produces malformed HTTP/1.1 requests with multiple conflicting Content-Length values on the wire.
Who is impacted:
* Applications using undici.request(), undici.Client, or similar low-level APIs with headers passed as flat arrays
* Applications that accept user-controlled header names without case-normalization
Potential consequences:
* Denial of Service: Strict HTTP parsers (proxies, servers) will reject requests with duplicate Content-Length headers (400 Bad Request)
*