PatchFirst · Свежие уязвимости
За последние 30 дней в Node.js опубликовано уязвимостей: 375; в каталоге KEV: 0.
Свежие сообщения об уязвимостях из анонсов разработчиков и новостей безопасности. Предупреждения не меняют рейтинг защищённости.
По данным OpenNet, в Node.js найдена уязвимость — удалённое выполнение кода (CVE-2026-111497). Точные затронутые версии не указаны. Версия с исправлением в сообщении не указана.
Что сделать сейчас: Проверьте, вышло ли обновление Node.js с исправлением, и установите его.
CVE-2026-111497
По данным GitHub Advisory Database, в Node.js найдена уязвимость — отказ в обслуживании (CVE-2026-109932). Точные затронутые версии не указаны. Версия с исправлением в сообщении не указана.
Что сделать сейчас: Проверьте, вышло ли обновление Node.js с исправлением, и установите его.
CVE-2026-109932
Уязвимостей: 7802
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. In versions 2026.1.12 through 2026.2.12, OpenClaw browser download helpers accepted an unsanitized output path. When invoked via the browser control gateway routes, this allowed path traversal to write downloads outside the intended OpenClaw temp downloads directory. This issue is not exposed via the AI agent tool schema (no `download` action). Exploitation requires authenticated CLI access or an authenticated gateway RPC token. Version 2026.2.13 fixes the issue.
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, authenticated attackers can read arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the browser tool's `upload` action. The server passed these paths to Playwright's `setInputFiles()` APIs without restricting them to a safe root. An attacker must reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise invoke the same browser control hook endpoints); present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as required by the Gateway configuration (In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the onboarding wizard generates a gateway
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, under iMessage `groupPolicy=allowlist`, group authorization could be satisfied by sender identities coming from the DM pairing store, broadening DM trust into group contexts. Version 2026.2.14 fixes the issue.
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated. Prior to version 2026.2.14, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs. iOS and macOS used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL. iOS and Android allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin. On a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. Thi
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, `skills.status` could disclose secrets to `operator.read` clients by returning raw resolved config values in `configChecks` for skill `requires.config` paths. Version 2026.2.14 stops including raw resolved config values in requirement checks (return only `{ path, satisfied }`) and narrows the Discord skill requirement to the token key. In addition to upgrading, users should rotate any Discord tokens that may have been exposed to read-scoped clients.
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, a mismatch between `rawCommand` and `command[]` in the node host `system.run` handler could cause allowlist/approval evaluation to be performed on one command while executing a different argv. This only impacts deployments that use the node host / companion node execution path (`system.run` on a node), enable allowlist-based exec policy (`security=allowlist`) with approval prompting driven by allowlist misses (for example `ask=on-miss`), allow an attacker to invoke `system.run`. Default/non-node configurations are not affected. Version 2026.2.14 enforces `rawCommand`/`command[]`
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, OpenClaw's SSRF protection could be bypassed using full-form IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals such as `0:0:0:0:0:ffff:7f00:1` (which is `127.0.0.1`). This could allow requests that should be blocked (loopback / private network / link-local metadata) to pass the SSRF guard. Version 2026.2.14 patches the issue.
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Versions 2026.1.8 through 2026.2.13 have a command injection in the maintainer/dev script `scripts/update-clawtributors.ts`. The issue affects contributors/maintainers (or CI) who run `bun scripts/update-clawtributors.ts` in a source checkout that contains a malicious commit author email (e.g. crafted `@users[.]noreply[.]github[.]com` values). Normal CLI usage is not affected (`npm i -g openclaw`): this script is not part of the shipped CLI and is not executed during routine operation. The script derived a GitHub login from `git log` author metadata and interpolated it into a shell command (via `execSync`)
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to OpenClaw version 2026.2.14, the Gateway tool accepted a tool-supplied `gatewayUrl` without sufficient restrictions, which could cause the OpenClaw host to attempt outbound WebSocket connections to user-specified targets. This requires the ability to invoke tools that accept `gatewayUrl` overrides (directly or indirectly). In typical setups this is limited to authenticated operators, trusted automation, or environments where tool calls are exposed to non-operators. In other words, this is not a drive-by issue for arbitrary internet users unless a deployment explicitly allows untrusted users to trig
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to OpenClaw version 2026.2.14, the Feishu extension previously allowed `sendMediaFeishu` to treat attacker-controlled `mediaUrl` values as local filesystem paths and read them directly. If an attacker can influence tool calls (directly or via prompt injection), they may be able to exfiltrate local files by supplying paths such as `/etc/passwd` as `mediaUrl`. Upgrade to OpenClaw `2026.2.14` or newer to receive a fix. The fix removes direct local file reads from this path and routes media loading through hardened helpers that enforce local-root restrictions.
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. OpenClaw macOS desktop client registers the `openclaw://` URL scheme. For `openclaw://agent` deep links without an unattended `key`, the app shows a confirmation dialog that previously displayed only the first 240 characters of the message, but executed the full message after the user clicked "Run." At the time of writing, the OpenClaw macOS desktop client is still in beta. In versions 2026.2.6 through 2026.2.13, an attacker could pad the message with whitespace to push a malicious payload outside the visible preview, increasing the chance a user approves a different message than the one that is actually e
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Versions 2026.2.13 and below allow the optional @openclaw/voice-call plugin Telnyx webhook handler to accept unsigned inbound webhook requests when telnyx.publicKey is not configured, enabling unauthenticated callers to forge Telnyx events. Telnyx webhooks are expected to be authenticated via Ed25519 signature verification. In affected versions, TelnyxProvider.verifyWebhook() could effectively fail open when no Telnyx public key was configured, allowing arbitrary HTTP POST requests to the voice-call webhook endpoint to be treated as legitimate Telnyx events. This only impacts deployments where the Voice Ca
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.2.14, browser-facing localhost mutation routes accepted cross-origin browser requests without explicit Origin/Referer validation. Loopback binding reduces remote exposure but does not prevent browser-initiated requests from malicious origins. A malicious website can trigger unauthorized state changes against a victim's local OpenClaw browser control plane (for example opening tabs, starting/stopping the browser, mutating storage/cookies) if the browser control service is reachable on loopback in the victim's browser context. Starting in version 2026.2.14, mutating HTTP methods (POST/PUT/PATCH
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.2.13, the optional BlueBubbles iMessage channel plugin could accept webhook requests as authenticated based only on the TCP peer address being loopback (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, `::ffff:127.0.0.1`) even when the configured webhook secret was missing or incorrect. This does not affect the default iMessage integration unless BlueBubbles is installed and enabled. Version 2026.2.13 contains a patch. Other mitigations include setting a non-empty BlueBubbles webhook password and avoiding deployments where a public-facing reverse proxy forwards to a loopback-bound Gateway without strong upstream authenti
Under certain circumstances, serializing sparse arrays using `uneval` or `stringify` could cause CPU and/or memory exhaustion. When this occurs on the server, it results in a DoS. This is extremely difficult to take advantage of in practice, as an attacker would have to manage to create a sparse array on the server — which is impossible in every mainstream wire format — and then that sparse array would have to be run through `uneval` or `stringify`.
Under certain circumstances, `uneval`ing untrusted data can produce output code that will create objects with polluted prototypes when later `eval`ed, meaning the output data can be a different shape from the input data.
systeminformation is a System and OS information library for node.js. Versions prior to 5.31.0 are vulnerable to command injection via unsanitized `locate` output in `versions()`. Version 5.31.0 fixes the issue.
systeminformation is a System and OS information library for node.js. In versions prior to 5.30.8, a command injection vulnerability in the `wifiNetworks()` function allows an attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands via an unsanitized network interface parameter in the retry code path. In `lib/wifi.js`, the `wifiNetworks()` function sanitizes the `iface` parameter on the initial call (line 437). However, when the initial scan returns empty results, a `setTimeout` retry (lines 440-441) calls `getWifiNetworkListIw(iface)` with the **original unsanitized** `iface` value, which is passed directly to `execSync('iwlist ${iface} scan')`. Any appli
fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. In versions 4.1.3 through 5.3.5, the XML parser can be forced to do an unlimited amount of entity expansion. With a very small XML input, it’s possible to make the parser spend seconds or even minutes processing a single request, effectively freezing the application. Version 5.3.6 fixes the issue. As a workaround, avoid using DOCTYPE parsing by `processEntities: false` option.
Fabric.js is a Javascript HTML5 canvas library. Prior to version 7.2.0, Fabric.js applies `escapeXml()` to text content during SVG export (`src/shapes/Text/TextSVGExportMixin.ts:186`) but fails to apply it to other user-controlled string values that are interpolated into SVG attribute markup. When attacker-controlled JSON is loaded via `loadFromJSON()` and later exported via `toSVG()`, the unescaped values break out of XML attributes and inject arbitrary SVG elements including event handlers. Any application that accepts user-supplied JSON (via `loadFromJSON()`, collaborative sharing, import features, CMS plugins) and renders the `toSVG()` ou
Сопоставьте установленный стек и версии со свежими базами уязвимостей.