PatchFirst · Свежие уязвимости
За последние 30 дней в Node.js опубликовано уязвимостей: 413; в каталоге KEV: 0.
Свежие сообщения об уязвимостях из анонсов разработчиков и новостей безопасности. Предупреждения не меняют рейтинг защищённости.
По данным GitHub Advisory Database, в Node.js найдена уязвимость — отказ в обслуживании (CVE-2026-109932). Точные затронутые версии не указаны. Версия с исправлением в сообщении не указана.
Что сделать сейчас: Проверьте, вышло ли обновление Node.js с исправлением, и установите его.
CVE-2026-109932
По данным OpenNet, в Node.js найдена уязвимость — удалённое выполнение кода (CVE-2026-111497). Точные затронутые версии не указаны. Версия с исправлением в сообщении не указана.
Что сделать сейчас: Проверьте, вышло ли обновление Node.js с исправлением, и установите его.
CVE-2026-111497
Уязвимостей: 7795
Nuxt is an open-source web development framework for Vue.js. From 3.1.0 until 3.21.10 and 4.5.1, an unauthenticated attacker can use a server island v-for prop, including vforToArray and , to trigger unbounded SSR memory allocation until MAX_VFOR_LENGTH = 100000 and crash the Nuxt process. This issue is fixed in 3.21.10 and 4.5.1.
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, requests to open external protocol URLs from web content did not take iframe sandbox restrictions into account, so a sandboxed iframe could cause an OS-registered external application to be launched. The frame sandbox state was also not made available to the app permission handlers, affecting apps that render untrusted content in sandboxed iframes and grant the openExternal permission by default when no setPermissionRequestHandler is installed. This issue is fixed in 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.9, 40.9.2, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, the DevTools reveal in file manager action could launch the target file rather than reveal it. An attacker with a separate means of running script inside the DevTools frontend, such as a malicious DevTools extension, could use showItemInFolder handling to execute native code outside the sandbox when DevTools is opened for windows exposed to untrusted content or untrusted DevTools extensions. This issue is fixed in 39.8.9, 40.9.2, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3.
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.9, 40.9.2, 41.2.2, and 42.0.0-beta.4, objects copied across the contextBridge boundary from untrusted content could carry an attacker-influenced prototype, enabling prototype-pollution-style attacks against preload code despite context isolation being enabled. Apps are only affected if their preload code accepts object arguments from untrusted content and reads properties from them without own-property checks, while apps that only accept primitive arguments or validate object arguments are not affected. This issue is fixed in
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.7, 40.9.0, 41.2.0, and 42.0.0-beta.1, the mode option of webContents.openDevTools() was not sanitized before use by the DevTools frontend. If an attacker can influence this value, script under their control may run in the DevTools context, which in unsandboxed configurations has access to Node.js, including when untrusted input reaches the mode argument of openDevTools() or untrusted content calls openDevTools() on a webview it embeds. This issue is fixed in 39.8.7, 40.9.0, 41.2.0, and 42.0.0-beta.1.
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.10, 41.10.3, and 42.0.1, a sandboxed iframe without the allow-popups keyword could still open a new window or trigger setWindowOpenHandler with no user interaction because new-window navigations taking the OpenURL path did not apply the iframe sandbox popup restriction. Apps that embed untrusted content in sandboxed iframes and rely on the absence of allow-popups to prevent window creation are affected, while apps that deny window creation in setWindowOpenHandler or do not embed untrusted content in sandboxed iframes are not a
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, some window options supplied by web content in the window.open() features string were applied to the new BrowserWindow without an allowlist. Untrusted content could set window options it should not control, including options that cause the main process to access attacker-chosen file or network paths, when untrusted content can call window.open() and the app does not override child window options via setWindowOpenHandler or overrideBrowserWindowOptions. This issue is fixed in 39.8.8, 40.9.0
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 40.10.6, 41.9.1, 42.5.1, and 43.0.0, when a custom protocol handler returned a ProtocolResponse with a url and no session, Electron made the upstream request through defaultSession instead of the session that handled the protocol. A cached response could then be reused across otherwise isolated session partitions. Apps that use ProtocolResponse.url, omit ProtocolResponse.session, and rely on separate sessions to isolate content are affected. This issue is fixed in versions 40.10.6, 41.9.1, 42.5.1, and 43.0.0.
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, when following HTTP redirects, net.fetch() and net.request() did not restrict which schemes a redirect could target. A remote server could redirect a request to a local resource, and if the app returns or forwards the response body, local file contents could be disclosed. Apps are only affected if they make net requests to attacker-influenced URLs with redirects followed and expose the response body. This issue is fixed in versions 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3.
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.10, 40.9.3, 41.4.0, and 42.0.0, a custom scheme registered with supportFetchAPI: true but without corsEnabled: true was not subject to CORS enforcement. A page loaded from a remote origin could therefore fetch() or XMLHttpRequest that scheme cross-origin and read the full response body, rather than the read being blocked. Apps that serve sensitive data from such a scheme and load remote or untrusted content in a renderer are affected. This issue is fixed in versions 39.8.10, 40.9.3, 41.4.0, and 42.0.0.
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.6, 40.9.0, 41.1.1, and 42.0.0-beta.1, shell.openPath() did not reject paths containing embedded null bytes. Apps that perform string-only validation of file paths, for example checking the file extension, before passing them to shell.openPath() could be bypassed, allowing an attacker-controlled path to open a different file than the one that passed validation. Apps are only affected if they pass paths derived from untrusted input to shell.openPath() and rely on string-based validation without a filesystem check. This issue is
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, extension tab and scripting APIs were not scoped to the extension's own session. A malicious or compromised extension loaded into one session could navigate, script, and read from windows belonging to a different session. Apps are only affected if they load Chrome extensions via session.loadExtension and rely on separate sessions to isolate that extension from other content. This issue is fixed in versions 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3.
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.9, 40.9.2, 41.2.2, and 42.0.0-beta.5, apps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via contextBridge may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with nodeIntegration enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access. Apps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via contextBridge, the standard pattern for wrapping ipcRenderer.invoke, i
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, the native autofill popup could be positioned by a cross-origin iframe outside that iframe's bounds, over the embedding page's UI, enabling clickjacking or spoofing of trusted UI. Apps are only affected if they embed untrusted content in iframes within windows that also display trusted UI. Apps that do not embed untrusted third-party content are not affected. This issue is fixed in versions 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3.
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.7, 40.9.0, 41.2.0, and 42.0.0-beta.1, serial-port and media permission checks made from an iframe passed the top-level frame origin to session.setPermissionCheckHandler instead of the requesting iframe origin. Origin-based handler logic could grant a cross-origin iframe device access intended only for the top-level origin. This issue is fixed in 39.8.7, 40.9.0, 41.2.0, and 42.0.0-beta.1.
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.10, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, offscreen rendering frame data received from the GPU process was not fully validated by the main process. A compromised GPU process could cause the main process to read out-of-bounds memory while producing paint event images, disclosing memory or crashing the app. This issue is fixed in 39.8.10, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3.
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, the check Electron uses on macOS to confirm it was launched by a same-signed parent process could be bypassed by a local process. Apps that enable fuse-based hardening restricting ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE and NODE_OPTIONS to same-signed parents rely on this check, and a local attacker could bypass it and run code inside the signed app, inheriting its TCC permissions and keychain access. This issue is fixed in 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3.
Ghost is a Node.js content management system. From 4.9.0 until 6.54.1, an input validation issue allowed any staff user to create a post with content in feature_image_caption that could be used to hijack another staff user's Ghost Admin session, resulting in privilege escalation. This issue is fixed in 6.54.1.
Ghost is a Node.js content management system. From 6.26.0 until 6.54.1, a validation issue allowed some functionality, such as Webmentions, to be abused by an unauthenticated user to make limited HTTP requests to hosts in the Ghost server's internal network. A successful attack would not result in any response data being returned. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.54.1.
Ghost is a Node.js content management system. From 2.2.0 until 6.54.1, Ghost Admin did not invalidate existing sessions on login which could have allowed for session fixation attacks. Successful exploitation would have required another vulnerability on the same domain where Ghost Admin was hosted. This issue is fixed in version 6.54.1.
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