PatchFirst · Свежие уязвимости
За последние 30 дней в linux опубликовано уязвимостей: 489; в каталоге KEV: 0.
Уязвимостей: 10963
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: drbg - Fix returning success on failure in CTR_DRBG drbg_ctr_generate() sometimes returns success when it fails, leaving the output buffer uninitialized. Fix it.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qat - protect service table iterations with service_lock The service_table list is protected by service_lock when entries are added or removed (in adf_service_add() and adf_service_remove()), but several functions iterate over the list without holding this lock. A concurrent adf_service_register() or adf_service_unregister() call could modify the list during traversal, leading to list corruption or a use-after-free. Fix this by holding service_lock across all list_for_each_entry() iterations of service_table in adf_dev_init(), adf_dev_start(), adf_dev_stop(), adf_
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qat - validate RSA CRT component lengths The generic RSA key parser (rsa_helper.c) bounds each CRT component (p, q, dp, dq, qinv) by the modulus size n_sz, but qat_rsa_setkey_crt() allocates half-size DMA buffers (key_sz / 2) and right-aligns each component with: memcpy(dst + half_key_sz - len, src, len) When a CRT component is larger than half_key_sz the subtraction underflows and memcpy writes past the DMA buffer, causing memory corruption. Add a len > half_key_sz check next to the existing !len check for each of the five CRT components so the driver falls
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: fsl-lpspi: terminate the RX channel on TX prepare failure path When dmaengine_prep_slave_sg() fails for the TX channel, the error path terminates the TX DMA channel but leaves the RX channel running. Since the RX channel was already submitted and issued prior to preparing the TX descriptor, returning -EINVAL causes the SPI core to unmap the DMA buffers while the RX DMA engine continues writing to them, leading to potential memory corruption or use-after-free. Terminate the RX channel before returning on the TX prepare failure path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: regulator: scmi: fix of_node refcount leak in scmi_regulator_probe() scmi_regulator_probe() calls of_find_node_by_name() which takes a reference on the returned device node. On the error path where process_scmi_regulator_of_node() fails, the function returns without calling of_node_put() on the child node, leaking the reference. Add of_node_put(np) on the error path to properly release the reference.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Prevent out-of-bounds read in glob matching String event fields are not necessarily NUL-terminated, so the filter predicate functions (filter_pred_string(), filter_pred_strloc() and filter_pred_strrelloc()) pass the field length to the regex match callbacks, and the length-aware matchers honour it. regex_match_glob() was the exception: it ignored the length and called glob_match(), which scans the string until it hits a NUL byte. Some string fields are not NUL-terminated. One example is the dynamic char array of the xfs_* namespace tracepoints, which is copied wit
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4: include MAY_WRITE in open permission mask for O_TRUNC POSIX requires write permission to truncate a file, so an open() that specifies O_TRUNC must be authorized for write access regardless of the O_ACCMODE access mode. nfs_open_permission_mask() builds the access mask passed to nfs_may_open(), which is the local authorization gate for OPENs the client serves itself from a cached write delegation via the can_open_delegated() path in nfs4_try_open_cached(). The mask is derived from O_ACCMODE alone, so an open(O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC) against a file the caller cannot write
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry() In exfat_find_dir_entry(), each TYPE_EXTEND (file name) entry advances the output pointer by a fixed amount while the loop guard only tracks the accumulated name length: if (++order == 2) uniname = p_uniname->name; else uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN; len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname); name_len += len; unichar = *(uniname+len); *(uniname+len) = 0x0; uniname grows by EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN (15) per name entry, but name_len grows only by the actual extracted length, which is shorter when a name frag
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file's mount's idmap. This results in odd edgecases like: 1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1 2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation 3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn't supplied
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fpga: dfl-afu: validate DMA mapping length in afu_dma_map_region() afu_ioctl_dma_map() accepts a 64-bit length from userspace via DFL_FPGA_PORT_DMA_MAP ioctl without an upper bound check. The value is passed to afu_dma_pin_pages() where npages is derived as length >> PAGE_SHIFT and passed to pin_user_pages_fast() which takes int nr_pages, causing implicit truncation if length is very large. Validate map.length at the ioctl entry point before calling afu_dma_map_region(), rejecting values whose page count exceeds INT_MAX.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: core: fix adapter deregistration race Adapters can be looked up by their id using i2c_get_adapter() which takes a reference to the embedded struct device. Remove the adapter from the IDR before tearing it down during deregistration (and on registration failure) to make sure its resources are not accessed after having been freed (e.g. the device name).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F3A keymap to the GPIO count rmi_f3a_initialize() takes the GPIO count from the device query register (f3a->gpio_count = buf & RMI_F3A_GPIO_COUNT, range 0..127). rmi_f3a_map_gpios() then allocates gpio_key_map with min(gpio_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) == at most 6 entries, but rmi_f3a_attention() iterates the full gpio_count and dereferences gpio_key_map[i], and input->keycodemax is set to the full gpio_count while input->keycode points at the 6-entry allocation. A device that reports gpio_count > 6 therefore causes an out-of-bounds read
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F30 keymap to the GPIO/LED count rmi_f30_map_gpios() allocates gpioled_key_map with min(gpioled_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) == at most 6 entries, but rmi_f30_attention() iterates the full f30->gpioled_count (device query register, range 0..31) and dereferences gpioled_key_map[i], and input->keycodemax is set to the full gpioled_count while input->keycode points at the 6-entry allocation. A device that reports gpioled_count > 6 with GPIO support enabled therefore causes an out-of-bounds read on the attention interrupt and out-of-bounds rea
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: elan_i2c - prevent division by zero and arithmetic underflow The Elan I2C touchpad driver queries the device for its physical dimensions and trace counts to calculate the device resolution and width. However, if the device firmware or device tree provides invalid zero values for x_traces or y_traces, it results in a fatal division-by-zero exception leading to a kernel panic during device probe. Add checks to ensure these parameters are non-zero before performing the division. If invalid trace values are detected, fall back to a safe default of 1. Additionally, prev
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported by the device into an on-stack buffer u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS]; which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num, but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device configuration block and is never clamped: ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f; The nibble can be 0..15, so a mal
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array: i = data[1] & 0x7f; if (data[1] & 0x80) { if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) ... } else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { ... } The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: mms114 - fix touch indexing for MMS134S and MMS136 The MMS134S and MMS136 touch controllers have an event size of 6 bytes rather than 8 bytes. When __mms114_read_reg() reads the touch data packet from the device into the touch buffer, the events are packed tightly at 6-byte intervals. However, the driver iterates through the events using standard C array indexing (touch[index]), where each element is sizeof(struct mms114_touch) (8 bytes) apart. As a result, any touch events beyond the first one are read from incorrect offsets and parsed improperly. Fix this by expli
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree: tw->data[tw->idx++] = data; if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) { ... tw->idx = 0; } The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes diffe
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a fixed-size on-stack buffer struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH]; which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes, i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from the device: packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE); if (packet_size <= 0) goto out; ... error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size, (u8 *)touch); packet_size is a single device registe
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor: plist->length = le32_to_cpu(id->rd_msg->desc[0].len); rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -> process_io_req() -> process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this change, was only rejected when zero. The so
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