Средний · CVSS 6.8EPSS 0,2%Нет опубликованного исправления
net: sparx5: fix sleep in atomic context in MAC table access
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sparx5: fix sleep in atomic context in MAC table access
sparx5_set_rx_mode() runs with netif_addr_lock_bh held and iterates
dev->mc via __dev_mc_sync(), which per address calls sparx5_mc_sync() /
sparx5_mc_unsync() -> sparx5_mact_learn() / sparx5_mact_forget(). These
take sparx5->lock, a mutex, and then poll the MAC access command
register with readx_poll_timeout(). A mutex may block, which is not
allowed from atomic context.
Convert the driver to the new .ndo_set_rx_mode_async callback introduced
in commit 3554b4345d85 ("net: introduce ndo_set_rx_mode_async and
netd
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Skip VMBus module cleanup for non-nested root partition
The VMBus module initialization function, hv_acpi_init(), currently
does nothing when running in the root partition and root is not nested
in another VM. But the initialization function reports success, so the
VMBus module is indeed loaded. VMBus functionality is not actually
needed, but the VMBus module must be loaded so that hv_vmbus_exists()
can answer correctly. Furthermore, the mshv_root dependency on the
VMBus module is needed as described in the commit message for
840b740a35bf ("mshv: Add con
Высокий · CVSS 7.8EPSS 0,18%Нет опубликованного исправления
Bluetooth: L2CAP: access chan->conn safely in get/setsockopt
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: access chan->conn safely in get/setsockopt
Since commit b66774b48dd9 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref")
l2cap_chan::conn has held reference and remains non-NULL also after the
corresponding hci_conn is deleted. In this state accessing various
fields eg. hci_conn::hdev is invalid, which leads to KASAN crash in
l2cap_sock_setsockopt() access of conn->hcon->hdev.
Check l2cap_chan::conn.hcon corresponds to an alive hci_conn before
trying to use it in l2cap_sock.c. Hold l2cap_chan_lock() in
getsockopt/setsockopt to ensure it
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject accept queue add unless BT_LISTEN
New sk should not be added to parent socket accept queue after last
l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() has run in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() and
state set to BT_CLOSED, as that can result to UAF on dereferencing the
dangling parent reference.
l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() may race with parent l2cap_chan teardown,
due to chan->state accessed without consistent locking:
[Task 1] [Task 2]
l2cap_sock_release(parent) l2cap_connect
l2cap_sock_shutdown pchan = l2cap_global
Средний · CVSS 4.8EPSS 0,21%Нет опубликованного исправления
Bluetooth: btmtksdio: Fix out-of-bounds DMA read in the TX path
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtksdio: Fix out-of-bounds DMA read in the TX path
btmtksdio_tx_packet() rounds the transfer size up to the SDIO block size
of 256 bytes, but hands the host controller the SKB buffer as is:
err = sdio_writesb(bdev->func, MTK_REG_CTDR, skb->data,
round_up(skb->len, MTK_SDIO_BLOCK_SIZE));
Only skb->len bytes hold packet data, so the controller reads up to 255
bytes of uninitialised memory and sends it to the device over the SDIO
bus. Depending on how much tailroom slack the SKB allocation happens to
carry, that read can also extend past the end of the bu
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Validate MTU in rfcomm_apply_pn() to prevent infinite loop
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Validate MTU in rfcomm_apply_pn() to prevent infinite loop
rfcomm_apply_pn() accepts the MTU value from a remote PN (Parameter
Negotiation) frame without checking for zero. When the remote peer
sends an MTU of zero, d->mtu is set to 0. This causes the sendmsg
path to enter an infinite loop when fragmenting data, as each fragment
has size == min_t(size_t, len, 0) == 0, so the remaining length never
decreases. The infinite allocation of zero-length skbs exhausts all
system memory.
Fix by clamping d->mtu to RFCOMM_DEFAULT_MTU when the negotiated
value is ze
Без оценкиEPSS 0,21%Нет опубликованного исправления
octeontx2-vf: fix workqueue and netdev race in probe/remove
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-vf: fix workqueue and netdev race in probe/remove
Initialize the VF workqueue before register_netdev() so ndo_set_rx_mode
does not queue work on a NULL workqueue. Unregister the netdev before
destroying the workqueue, and add proper probe error cleanup.
Средний · CVSS 6.8EPSS 0,21%Нет опубликованного исправления
net/sched: act_ife: Only operate on Ethernet frames
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ife: Only operate on Ethernet frames
act_ife encapsulates/decapsulates the original Ethernet header and uses
skb->dev->hard_header_len as the length of that header. That is only
correct for Ethernet devices: on a device where hard_header_len does not
match the L2 header that was actually pulled (PPP reports PPP_HDRLEN
while nothing is stripped on ingress), the ingress skb_push()/skb_pull()
use the wrong length and can hit skb_under_panic when headroom is tight.
IFE is Ethernet-only by design - it builds an outer ethhdr, rewrites
h_source/h_dest/h_proto, and
net/rds: use wq_has_sleeper() in rds_cong_map_updated()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: use wq_has_sleeper() in rds_cong_map_updated()
rds_cong_map_updated() runs after a peer's congestion map has been
rewritten (by rds_tcp_cong_recv() and rds_ib_cong_recv(), or the
clear-all in the loopback and IB send-completion paths). It bumps
rds_cong_generation and then checks waitqueue_active() on
map->m_waitq and on rds_poll_waitq to decide whether anyone needs
waking. atomic_inc() carries no ordering and waitqueue_active() is a
plain load, so nothing orders the map and generation stores before
the wait queue reads. The waiters do the mirror image: rds_cong
net/sched: act_skbmod: fix length calculations and avoid invalid header warnings
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_skbmod: fix length calculations and avoid invalid header warnings
syzbot reported a warning in skb_network_header_len() triggered
by tcf_skbmod_act():
!skb_transport_header_was_set(skb)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14949 at include/linux/skbuff.h:3243 skb_network_header_len include/linux/skbuff.h:3243 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14949 at net/sched/act_skbmod.c:55 tcf_skbmod_act+0xfe8/0x1810 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:55
There are a few issues in tcf_skbmod_act():
1. Calling skb_network_header_len() assumes skb->transport_header is set,
which is not guarante
Средний · CVSS 6.8EPSS 0,21%Нет опубликованного исправления
net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum
fq_init() computes quantum = 2 * psched_mtu() and initial_quantum = 10 *
psched_mtu() with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy
with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return
0x80000000; the 2 * and 10 * multiplications wrap to 0 in 32-bit
arithmetic, so q->quantum == 0. Then in fq_dequeue() the credit-refill
loop adds 0 to f->credit (which stays <= 0) and goto begin loops
forever under the qdisc lock, creating a soft lockup.
Clamp psched_mtu() to [1, 1 << 20] before
net/sched: fq_codel: clamp default quantum and mtu
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fq_codel: clamp default quantum and mtu
fq_codel_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) without
clamping. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0
accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, which
overflows the signed flow->deficit to INT_MIN in fq_codel_dequeue(),
causing an infinite loop and soft lockup. Emulate fq_codel_change()
and constrain to [256, FQ_CODEL_QUANTUM_MAX].
The same unclamped psched_mtu() is assigned to q->cparams.mtu a bit
below, and fq_codel_change() never updates it. codel_should_drop()
tests
net/sched: fq_pie: clamp default quantum to avoid signed overflow
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fq_pie: clamp default quantum to avoid signed overflow
fq_pie_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) without
clamping. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0
accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, which
overflows the signed flow->deficit to INT_MIN in fq_pie_qdisc_dequeue(),
causing an infinite loop and soft lockup. Emulate fq_pie_policy which
is already bounded to [1, 1 << 20]; clamp the default to [256, 1 << 20].
256 matches fq_codel's floor and is a sane minimum for a DRR quantum.
Conditions to recreate th
net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum before hhf_change() to avoid overflow
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum before hhf_change() to avoid overflow
hhf_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) with no overflow
check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting
MTU 2147483634) makes weight * quantum overflow the signed deficit in
hhf_dequeue(), spinning forever.
Clamp q->quantum before hhf_change() so both the opt and !opt paths see
a sane quantum. Without this, bare "tc qdisc add ... hhf" succeeds with
a clamped quantum but "tc qdisc add ... hhf limit 1000" (any option
present) fails with -EINVAL because hhf_change() re
net/sched: sfq: clamp quantum to avoid signed overflow soft lockup
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sfq: clamp quantum to avoid signed overflow soft lockup
sfq_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) (unsigned). A
device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU
2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, so slot->allot = INT_MIN
and INT_MIN + INT_MIN toggles between INT_MIN and 0 forever, spinning
sfq_dequeue() under the qdisc lock.
Clamp the quantum to [256, 1 << 20] so the refill loop terminates. The
lower bound also covers q->quantum == 0 (psched_mtu() returning 0),
which spins sfq_dequeue() identically. sfq_change() alr
net/sched: sch_teql: restore skb->dev on the slave failure path
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_teql: restore skb->dev on the slave failure path
teql_master_xmit() sets skb->dev = slave before calling the slave's
ndo_start_xmit(), but never restores it when that transmit fails. The
skb then walks on to the next slave still pointing at the previous one.
If a later slave has no resolved neighbour, teql_resolve() hands the skb
to neigh_event_send(), which queues it on that neighbour's arp_queue
with the stale skb->dev. skb->dev holds no reference, so deleting the
previous slave frees the net_device while the skb is still queued.
Whatever runs next on that
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: st33zp24: Return zero on status read failure
st33zp24_status() ignores the result of the transport read and returns
data even when no byte was received. The I2C transport, for example,
skips i2c_master_recv() when the register-select write is short or fails,
leaving data uninitialized. The resulting stack value can be interpreted
as TPM_STS flags and let status checks complete spuriously.
The status callback cannot propagate a transport error. Return zero
unless recv() reports exactly one byte. With no status bits set, callers
retry or take their existing timeout or e
ASoC: dapm: Fix off-by-one check on the second enum channel
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: dapm: Fix off-by-one check on the second enum channel
The snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double() rejects item[0] once it reaches
e->items, but it lets item[1] be equal to it. Both go on to
snd_soc_enum_item_to_val(), which indexes e->values with no bound of
its own, so an enum with a value table reads one element past the end.
The indexing arrived with the MUX consolidation, which relaxed the
item[1] check in the same hunk. The value MUX handler it deleted used
>= there, and the snd_soc_put_enum_double() in soc-ops.c still does.
Only adav80x pairs a value table with two s
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: validate banner payload length
When parsing the Ceph messenger v2 protocol banner, the `payload_len` field
is decoded from the banner prefix. If a client sends a banner with a
`payload_len` of 0, the kernel sets up a 0-length socket read. This
violates an invariant in the state machine, triggering a warning in
`populate_in_iter()`:
------------[ cut here ]------------
!iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter)
WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at populate_in_iter
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 [inline], CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070
WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at cep
virtio-net: Ensure that TCP packets don't overflow gso_segs
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio-net: Ensure that TCP packets don't overflow gso_segs
The user can specify any gso_size in a packet crafted with an AF_PACKET
PACKET_VNET_HDR socket, even smaller than TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. At the
same time, GSO_MAX_SIZE = 8 * GSO_MAX_SEGS = 8 * 65535. When the user
crafts a packet with gso_size < 8, there is a risk for partial GSO to
overflow the 16-bit gso_segs field when dividing the SKB length by
gso_size.
Adjust gso_size of TCP packets to be at least TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. Keep
gso_size of UDP GSO packets, as gso_size=1 is valid and explicitly
tested at tools/tes