Symfony: Email Header Injection via Non-Token Characters in Mime Parameter Names
Symfony is a PHP framework for web and console applications and a set of reusable PHP components. Prior to 5.4.52, 6.4.40, 7.4.12, and 8.0.12, Symfony\Component\Mime\Header\ParameterizedHeader validates and encodes parameter values but emits parameter names verbatim, allowing a caller that derives a parameter name from untrusted input to include CRLF or other non-token bytes and inject additional headers into rendered structured mail headers such as Content-Type or Content-Disposition. This issue is reported as fixed in versions 5.4.52, 6.4.40, 7.4.12, and 8.0.12.
Symfony: Email Header / SMTP Command Injection via CRLF in Symfony\Component\Mime\Address
### Description
`Symfony\Component\Mime\Address` is the value-object every Symfony Mailer address (to/cc/bcc/from/reply-to) flows through; its constructor is documented as validating the address and throwing on invalid input, so developers treat it as a security boundary.
The constructor accepts email addresses whose local-part (the part before `@`) is an RFC-5322 *quoted string* containing raw `\r\n` bytes — e.g. `"x\r\nBcc: attacker@evil"@example.com`. The stored address is later emitted verbatim into (1) the rendered message headers and (2) `SmtpTransport`'s `MAIL FROM:<...>` / `RCPT TO:<...>` protocol lines, turning the embedded CRLF in
An issue was discovered in Symfony 2.8.0 through 2.8.50, 3.4.0 through 3.4.34, 4.2.0 through 4.2.11, and 4.3.0 through 4.3.7. If an application passes unvalidated user input as the file for which MIME type validation should occur, then arbitrary arguments are passed to the underlying file command. This is related to symfony/http-foundation (and symfony/mime in 4.3.x).